We prove that the constructive weighted coalitional manipulation problem for the Schulze voting rule can be solved in polynomial time for an unbounded number of candidates and an unbounded number of manipulators.
Introduction
The Schulze voting rule [10] is a recent method for preference aggregation among a group of agents or voters. Because of its many desirable mathematical properties, it has attracted a lot of attention in collective decision making and has found its way into implementations for various applications.
However, several studies have also suggested that the Schulze voting rule is vulnerable to voting manipulation (aka strategic voting). In the light of the famous GibbardSatterthwaite theorem, which in principle excludes truthful voting in most cases, voting manipulation could be made prohibitive by using computational hardness (cf., e.g., [1, 2, 3] ). Unfortunately, the manipulation problem for Schulze voting has been shown to be solvable in polynomial time for many computational scenarios.
Parkes and Xia [9] showed that constructive unweighted coalitional manipulation (UCM) for one single manipulator and destructive UCM for an arbitrary number of manipulators are solvable in polynomial time. Building on this work, Gaspers et al. [4] found that constructive UCM is polynomial-time computable and established that constructive weighted coalitional manipulation (WCM) is fixed-parameter tractable (in the number of candidates) in the co-winner model. In addition, Hemaspaandra, Lavaee, and Menton [5] proved that constructive WCM in the unique-winner model and destructive WCM in both models are also fixed-parameter tractable.
We improve on these results and give an algorithm that solves constructive WCM in polynomial time even for an unbounded number of candidates. As the Parkes-Xia algorithm [9] for destructive UCM is easily adaptable to destructive WCM in both the unique and the co-winner model, 1 all open problems identified in [5] regarding the complexity of WCM for Schulze voting are thus settled: they are all polynomial-time computable.
The Schulze voting rule
Voting. Let X = {x 1 , . . . , x m } be a finite, non-empty set of m alternatives or candidates, and let A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } be a finite, non-empty multi-set of n agents or voters. We assume that each voter a i has a weight w i ∈ N \ {0}; e.g., a i could stand representatively for a coalition of w i unanimous voters. Each voter a i ∈ A imposes a total order on the set of candidates which expresses a i 's preferences and which is called a i 's vote; more specifically, a vote of voter a i ∈ A is given by a bijective function π i : X → {1, . . . , m}, where π i (x) > π i (y) means that a i strictly prefers x to y. (Note that incomparable candidates are excluded.) A weighted voting profile is a sequence (π, w) = (π 1 , . . . , π n ; w 1 , . . . , w n ) containing a vote (of weight w i ) from each voter a i .
A voting rule is a mapping F : (π 1 , . . . , π n ; w 1 , . . . , w n ) → P + (X), i.e., F assigns a nonempty set of candidates to each possible weighted voting profile (π 1 , . . . , π n ; w 1 , . . . w n ). If F (π 1 , . . . , π n ; w 1 , . . . , w n ) is a singleton-set then the winning candidate is called unique winner of the election under voting rule F ; if F (π 1 , . . . , π n ; w 1 , . . . , w n ) contains at least two candidates then these candidates are called co-winners under F .
Weighted majority graph. The Schulze voting rule is based on the method of pairwise comparisons. Given a weighted voting profile (π, w) = (π 1 , . . . , π n ; w 1 , . . . , w n ) and distinct candidates x, y ∈ X, let ω (π,w) (x, y) denote the number of voters that strictly prefer x to y minus the number of voters that strictly prefer y to x, i.e.,
So, if ω (π,w) (x, y) > 0 then the majority of voters prefers x to y.
The outcomes of the pairwise comparisons are collected as edge annotations to the complete directed graph K = (X, E) on vertex set X, i.e, the edge set of K is E = X × X \ { (x, x) | x ∈ X }. In particular, for weight function ω (π,w) : E → Z : (x, y) → ω (π,w) (x, y), the skew-symmetric graph (K, ω (π,w) ) is the weighted majority graph for the weighted voting profile (π, w). In the forthcoming, we also consider weight functions for K that do not necessarily correspond to voting profiles.
Schulze method. The Schulze voting rule evaluates the weighted majority graph in a specific path-based way. For our purposes, it is useful to introduce the relevant notions for a weighted graph (K, ω) equipped with an arbitrary weight function ω : E → Z. For each path p = (v 1 , . . . , v ℓ ) in (K, ω), the strength s[ω](p) of path p is defined to be the minimum weight of two candidates consecutively occurring on p, i.e.,
For distinct candidates x and y, the path strength S[ω](x, y) is defined to be the maximum strength of an (x, y)-path in (K, ω), i.e.,
Finally, a candidate x ∈ X is a Schulze winner for weighted voting profile (π, w) if and
The following proposition summarizes both that the Schulze voting rule is, indeed, welldefined and that deciding whether there is a unique Schulze winner is also easily possible.
Proposition 2.1. Let (π, w) be any weighted voting profile for candidate set X and voter set A.
[10] There always exists a Schulze winner for the weighted voting profile (π, w).

[9] A candidate x ∈ X is a unique Schulze winner for weighted voting profile (π, w) if and only if
S[ω (π,w) ](x, y) > S[ω (π,w) ](y, x) for all y ∈ X \ {x}.
Unique-Winner Weighted Coalitional Manipulation
Voting manipulation consists of fixing the voting behavior of a coalition of manipulators in order to make a certain candidate the winner of the election. More specifically, we consider the following computational problem for finding a unique winner with respect to the Schulze voting rule (the co-winner version will be discussed in Sect. 4):
Problem:
Unique-Winner WCM Instance:
A candidate set X, weighted voting profile (π 1 , . . . , π k ; w 1 , . . . , w k ) of non-manipulators, weights (w k+1 , . . . , w n ) of manipulators, and manipulation candidate c ∈ X Task:
Find votes π k+1 , . . . , π n such that c is a unique Schulze winner for the weighted voting profile (π 1 , . . . , π n ; w 1 , . . . , w n ), or indicate non-existence
The following theorem is the key to a polynomial algorithm for Unique-Winner WCM.
There is a (finite) function U : X → Z which can be computed in polynomial time such that the following two statements are equivalent:
1. There exist votes (π k+1 , . . . , π n ) such that c is a unique Schulze winner for the weighted voting profile (π 1 , . . . , π n ; w 1 , . . . , w n ).
In Lemma 3.4, we will see that the function U can be computed in (non-optimal) time O(m 5 ) (for an O(m 3 ) bound, see [8] ), given the weighted majority graph. Together with checking the second condition of Theorem 3.1 for m − 1 candidates, this gives an algorithm whose running time is dominated by the time needed for computing the function U . Note that it takes O(nm 2 ) steps to compute the weighted majority graph in the first place.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is split into two parts, each of which is covered by its own subsection. Subsection 3.1 (necessity) describes an algorithm for computing the function U and proves its correctness given that there exist manipulator's votes to make c a unique Schulze winner. Subsection 3.2 (sufficiency) describes an algorithm for using the function U to determine the manipulator's votes, given that the second condition of Theorem 3.1 is satisfied. Formally, Theorem 3.1 follows from Lemma 3.4 and Corollary 3.8. Algorithm. The following algorithm contains a description of how to compute function U :
while Rule 1 or Rule 2 is applicable to U do apply the rule; 
• Rule 2. If there are candidates x, y ∈ X \ {c} such that U (y) < U (x) and ω • (y, x) − W ≥ U (y), set U (x) ← U (y).
Lemma 3.2. Rule 1 is correct.
Proof. Suppose that the invariant is violated for the first time after the rule has been applied, so
Since c is the unique winner for profile
, so there must be a candidate y on path p with
. But this would mean that the invariant had already been violated before the rule had been applied.
Lemma 3.3. Rule 2 is correct.
Proof. Suppose the invariant is violated for the first time after the rule has been applied to candidates x and y, i.e.,
. This is a contradiction, as it implies that the invariant had already been violated before the rule was even applied.
Lemma 3.4. Algorithm 1 computes a function U : X → Z in O(m 5 ) time for which it holds that if the manipulators can vote such that c is the unique Schulze winner, then
Proof. The runtime bound follows from two observations:
• We can check if and where a rule can be applied and apply it in O(m 2 ) time.
• Whenever a rule is applied at a candidate x, U (x) must strictly decrease. As U (x) can only assume values from the set { ω • (y, z) + W | y, z ∈ X }, such a decrease can only happen at most O(m 2 ) times at one specific candidate, and thus at most O(m 3 ) times in total.
The inequality is a direct consequence of the invariant.
Computing the votes of the manipulators
Algorithm. We have seen by now that we can use the function U computed by Algorithm 1 to formulate a necessary condition for when the manipulators can be successful. We will see now that this necessary condition is also sufficient, as we can then use the function U to construct votes for the manipulators that make c the unique Schulze winner. Algorithm 2 shows how to construct these votes:
Lemma 3.5. There exists a (c, x)-path in G for all candidates x ∈ X.
that Algorithm 1 runs in polynomial time lies in the difference between their Rule 2, which reduces the values of the bounds by 2 per application, and our Rule 1, which is more efficient in respect thereof. Rule 3 of Gaspers et al. corresponds to our Rule 2.
Input: Graph (K, ω • ) = (X, E, ω • ), candidate set X, non-manipulators' weights ω • (x, y), candidate c ∈ X, total weight W of manipulators, function U computed by Algorithm 1 Output: A complete ranking R that can be voted by all manipulators for a successful manipulation, if the election can be manipulated begin Construct directed graph G = (X, E ′ ) so that, for x = y,
Algorithm 2: Computation of the votes of the manipulators
Proof. Suppose the claim does not hold, and choose x without a (c, x)-path such that U (x) is maximum among all candidates without such a path. Since Rule 1 is inapplicable to U , there exists a (c, x)-path P = (y 1 , . . . , y ℓ ) in K with min{ω
, there is a candidate y i with maximal index i such that U (y i ) > U (x). Let p ′ be the (y i , x)-subpath of p. This path p ′ also exists in G by construction, and there is also a (c, y i )-path in G due to the maximality of U (x). Thus, there exists a (c, x)-path in G. This is a contradiction.
Thus, there exists a spanning arborescence T of G rooted at c. From this arborescence, we can obtain a vote ζ such that if (x, y) ∈ E(T ) ∨ U (x) > U (y) then ζ(x) > ζ(y). As T does not contain an edge (x, y) ∈ E(T ) with U (x) < U (y), such a vote exists. We choose all manipulators to vote ζ, so we set π • = def (ζ, . . . , ζ) and (
Proof. Let p denote a (c, x)-path p = (y 1 , . . . , y ℓ ) in T . All edges in T are also edges in G, so min{U (y i−1 ), ω • (y i−1 , y i ) + W } ≥ U (y i ) for all i ∈ {2, . . . , ℓ}. By a simple inductive argument and since the vote ζ is consistent with all edges in T , we have
, which proves the claim.
Proof. Let p denote any (x, c)-path. We consider two cases:
• Assume that there is a candidate y = c on p with U (y) > U (x). Then, choose y among these candidates closest to x on p, and let z be the candidate immediately preceding 3 Notice that this is in contrast to a proposed counterexample against all manipulators being able to vote the same way in the unique-winner model by Menton and Singh in their preliminary report [7] (but dropped in the conference version [6] ). In that construction, manipulators vote differently in order to get candidate p strictly above candidate a which in fact, does not guarantee that p is also strictly above candidate c. In our Algorithm 2, all manipulators vote the same. y on p. It must hold that ζ(y) > ζ(z), for U (z) ≤ U (x) < U (y). As Rule 3.1 is not applicable to U , we obtain that
• Otherwise, it holds for all candidates y = c on p that U (y) ≤ U (x). Let z be the candidate preceding c on p.
The claim follows. Proof. We conclude from the previous two lemmas that
for all x ∈ X \ {c}. Hence, c is a unique Schulze winner.
Co-winner Weighted Coalitional Manipulation
We briefly discuss the co-winner variant of the weighted coalitional manipulation problem, i.e., checking whether candidate c can be made a Schulze winner though not the only one with respect to the same voting profile.
Problem:
Co-winner WCM Instance:
Find votes π k+1 , . . . , π n such that c is a Schulze winner for the weighted voting profile (π 1 , . . . , π n ; w 1 , . . . , w n ), or indicate non-existence Following the arguments in Sect. 3 literally, the algorithms for Unique-Winner WCM can be easily adapted to solve Co-winner WCM. A modification is only required for Algorithm 1 computing U . In contrast to the unique winner problem, we allow the bounds in the invariant to be non-strict, i.e., we allow the relaxed inequality U (x) ≥ S[ω •• ](x, c). This leads to the replacement of Rule 2 by a slightly modified rule:
• Rule 2'. If there are candidates x, y ∈ X \ {c} such that U (x) > U (y) and ω • (y, x) − W > U (y), set U (x) ← U (y).
With everything else unchanged, we can easily re-prove a slightly different second condition for a successful manipulation (in the spirit of Theorem 3.1):
Theorem 4.1. Let (X, (π, . . . , π k ), (w 1 , . . . , w n ), c) be a Co-winner WCM instance. There is a (finite) function U : X → Z which can be computed in polynomial time such that the following two statements are equivalent:
2. U (x) ≥ ω (π 1 ,...,π k ;w 1 ,...,w k ) (x, c) − (w k+1 + · · · + w n ) for all x ∈ X \ {c}.
Since the function U can still be computed in time O(m 5 ), Co-winner WCM is solvable in polynomial time, too.
